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NOTES
LIABILITY OF CERTIFIERS OF PRODUCTS FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES TO THE USER
OR CONSUMER
The certification of products by independent testing agencies' has
become an increasingly important element of modem advertising and
marketing.2 Manufacturers employ certification to increase consumer
demand for their products,3 and consumers rely on certification in choos-
ing the products they buy.4 As concern for the safety and quality of
products increases, the importance of certification for both the manu-
facturer and the consumer grows correspondingly. 5
1 "Independent testing agencies" may be defined as private organizations that
autonomously test and certify products for consumer or manufacturer clients. The use of
the term "certifier" in this note refers only to such testing agencies.
Groups other than independent testing agencies, such as trade associations, individual
companies, government agencies, and trade unions, also engage in the business of testing
and certifying products. Each tests and certifies in a different manner and for a different
purpose. Taylor, Certification Marks-Success or Failure?, 23 J. MARKETING, July 1958,
at 39. The methods and potential liability of such groups are beyond the scope of this
discussion.
2 Gregor, Seal of Approval: The Role of Independent Testing Laboratories, 50
MANAGEMENT REv., Jan. 1961, at 38.
3 For most manufacturers, certification by an independent testing agency serves a
dual purpose. First, testing operates to ensure the safety and quality of the manufacturer's
product. At the same time, certification acts as a valuable tool in advertising. To the
extent the certifier is both independent and impartial, therefore, both goals are served
effectively. Id. at 40.
4 Many claim that certification-at least that done by testing agencies under contract
with manufacturer clients--serves only incidentally as an aid to the consumer. One com-
mentator has written that there is generally "little desire to aid the consumer directly
in the buying process. In most instances, any benefit to the consumer is secondary and
indirect." Taylor, supra note 1, at 46. Those testing agencies serving consumer clients,
however, do not fit this description.
Regardless of the principal purpose of certification, there can be no doubt that
many consumers rely on the certifier's representation of safety and quality in products.
If they did not, there would be little market, if any, for the certifier's services. Although
no statistics have been uncovered, both manufacturers and certifiers believe that consumer
reliance is widespread. See, e.g., Hecht, Parents' Seal Is Still Assurance of Worthiness, 37
ADvE.RTiSING AGE, Nov. 14, 1966, at 135; Magazine Puts Seal on Its Own Success, Bus.
WEER, March 19, 1966, at 190; The Public Gives UL Its Seal of Approval, Bus. WE, Sept.
18, 1965, at 92; Tools for Confidence Building, 80 SALES MANAGEMENT, Jan. 6, 1958, at 64.
5 Recognition of this expanding importance is illustrated by two recent investigations
of independent testing agencies conducted by the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions and the National Commission on Product Safety. Bender, Is a So-Called 'Seal of
Approval' What Consumers Think It Is?, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1969, at 22, col. 1. These
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In view of this development, certifier liability for personal injuries
to the user or consumer of goods has become a significant problem. Re-
cent decisions expanding the liability of the manufacturer of goods0
suggest a similar expansion of the certifier's liability. At the same time,
however, differences between manufacturers and certifiers and among
certifiers themselves may warrant limitations on that liability.
I
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Under traditional tort law, the certifier's liability for personal in-
juries to the user or consumer may be based on negligent misrepresenta-
tion.7 Certification clearly involves the representation that the product
certified is safe for ordinary use;8 when the product proves unsafe, and
investigations have focused primarily on the practices of Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc.,
the Good Housekeeping Institute (Good Housekeeping), and the Parents' Magazine Con-
sumer Service Bureau (Parents' Magazine), and both have produced a series of charges
and countercharges concerning certification practices. E.g., id., Feb. 15, 1969, at 15, col. 1;
id., Oct. 1, 1969, at 43, col. 1; note 9 infra.
The findings and recommendations of the National Commission on Product Safety
have recently been published as NATIONAL COMM'N ON PRODUcT S~t Y, FINAL REPORT
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Comm'N REPORT].
6 Notes 24-28 & 33 infra.
7 For a discussion of the historical development of the tort of negligent misrepresenta-
tion, see W. PRossER, HANDaOOK OF THE LAw or TORTS § 102 (3d ed. 1964). Prosser indicates
that traditionally the theory of negligent misrepresentation has been applied almost ex-
clusively to cases of economic loss. He argues, however, that many actions for personal
injuries, although brought under the general theory of negligence, have actually involved
negligent misrepresentation. Id. § 33.
8 Safety testing and certification are principal functions of all independent testing
agencies, whether they deal with manufacturer or consumer clients. See Gregor, supra
note 2, at 39-40. Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., for example, tests products only for
safety. One executive at Underwriters' has described its seal as follows:
Now, the public itself understands that the seal means something important-
although they are a bit hazy as to what that something is....
Underwriters' Laboratories itself has no doubt as to what its label means.
When this non-profit organization puts its stamp on a product, it is saying just
one thing. The product is safe. The label does not guarantee high quality.
The Public Gives UL Its Seal of Approval, supra note 4. Underwriters' now tests for all
possible defects relating to safety. Corm,'N REPORT 55.
Other certifiers, such as Parents' Magazine and Good Housekeeping, test and certify
for both safety and quality. The Good Housekeeping Seal and the Parents' Magazine
Guaranteed Seal apply to any "defect" in the certified product. See Magazine Puts Seal
on Its Own Success, supra note 4, at 191-92; Information on the Parents' Magazine
Guaranteed Seal 2 (undated pamphlet published by Parents' Magazine).
In testimony before the National Commission on Product Safety, however, representa-
tives of both Good Housekeeping and Parents' Magazine denied any representation of
either safety or quality in their seals., Yet, under cross-examination, each admitted that
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personal injuries result, negligence in the testing or certification of the
product may be involved.9
Although recovery against the certifier has traditionally required
privity of contract,' 0 this requirement does not apply to cases of personal
injury arising from negligent certification." In Hempstead v. General
testing for safety and quality was an integral part of certification by both. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 1, 1969, at 43, col. 1.
9 Allegations of widespread negligence in the testing and certification of products
have been made in the recent federal investigations. In testimony before the National
Commission on Product Safety, attorney Irving D. Gaines stated that any manufacturer
could obtain the seal of either Good Housekeeping or Parents' Magazine simply by doing
enough advertising. Bender, supra note 5. Previously, Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal
had charged that three products seized by the Food and Drug Administration as unsafe
continued to carry the Good Housekeeping Seal and continued to be advertised in Good
Housekeeping magazine. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1969, at 15, col. 2.
These charges, needless to say, have been denied. Id., Oct. 1, 1969, at 43, col. 1. For
example, Good Housekeeping claims that
the institute tests every product offered for sale in the magazine's advertising
pages, and scrutinizes every line of ad copy ....
No product is accepted for advertising until it is tested; no ad for that
product is run until the copy claims are examined and, if necessary, altered ....
Magazine Puts Seal on Its Own Success, supra note 4, at 192.
Parents' Magazine is somewhat more conservative in describing its operations: "In
the statement describing the Guaranteed Seal there is no representation that products or
services are tested or evaluated .... Nevertheless, we do testing and evaluation under the
guarantee program." Information on the Parents' Magazine Guaranteed Seal, supra note
8, at 1.
10 The privity requirement in certification cases had its origin in National Iron &
Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924). There the defendants were employed
by the seller to inspect, test, and certify certain re-laying rails. The plaintiff subsequently
purchased the rails in reliance on the defendants' certificate of inspection. The court
refused to impose liability for the purchase price of the rails, holding that the certifiers'
"obligations . . , extended only to persons who bought and paid for their services." Id.
at 246, 143 N.E. at 834. Similarly, in related areas of the law, courts have imposed a
requirement of privity of contract on recovery for negligent misrepresentation. W. PROSSER,
supra note 7, § 102, at 721-24.
An exception to the privity rule has arisen in certification cases in which the person
making the representation has actual knowledge of reliance by a third party and acts
primarily for his benefit. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
11 Most cases dealing with negligent misrepresentation have involved economic loss
rather than personal injury. Note 7 supra. Although a requirement of privity of contract
is appropriate in the former case, it is not appropriate in the latter. First, the basic reason
for requiring privity in cases of economic loss has been the courts' fear of a potentially
burdensome and unforeseeable liability--"a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.
170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). This reasoning does not apply to cases of personal
injury, where the extent of liability is arguably more foreseeable, See Note, Economic
Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 917, 953-58 (1966).
Moreover, courts have traditionally been more willing to compensate for personal
injury than for economic loss. Id. at 928-29. Thus, following the landmark decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 NY, 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), nearly every American
jurisdiction abandoned the privity doctrine, allowing recovery by the remote user or
[Vol. 56:132
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Fire Extinguisher Corp.,12 a federal court refused to apply the privity
doctrine and imposed liability on the certifier of a fire extinguisher that
exploded, causing personal injury to the user. While the court framed
the issue in terms of simple negligence, 13 its reasoning applies equally
to the theory of negligent misrepresentation. 14
Similarly, in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.,15 the court rejected the
privity doctrine as inapplicable to cases of personal injury caused by the
negligent misrepresentation of the certifier. There the purchaser of
shoes carrying the Good Housekeeping Seal sustained personal injury
when the shoes, unable to hold on vinyl flooring, proved to be defec-
tively designed. Imposing liability on the certifier for negligent mis-
representation, the court argued that
[i]n voluntarily assuming this business relationship, . . [the
certifier] has placed itself in the position where public policy
imposes upon it the duty to use ordinary care in the issuance
of its seal and certification of quality so that members of the con-
suming public who rely on its endorsement are not unreasonably
exposed to the risk of harm.16
consumer for personal injury caused by the negligence of the manufacturer of goods.
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ.
1099, 1100-03 (1960). At the same time, in the face of attempts to extend the MacPherson
doctrine, "courts have almost unanimously denied claims for recovery in negligence for
economic loss against the remote manufacturer of a defective product." Note, supra at 929
(footnote omitted).
Today, a similar pattern appears to be emerging with respect to strict liability in
tort. Compare Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962), with Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965).
12 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
13 Here the court relied upon REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) or Torrs § 324A(a) (1965):
Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to tender services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm ....
14 Of course, one major difference between liability for simple negligence (e.g., under
§ 324A(a) of the Restatement) and liability for negligent misrepresentation is that, in the
former case, reliance by the third party need not be shown to sustain recovery. In view
of the rationale behind imposing liability for negligence on the certifier, however, a
requirement of reliance appears appropriate. Note 16 infra.
15 276 Cal, App. 2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
16 Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
Unlike the court in Hempstead, the California court cited RwrSATEMENT (SEcohp) oF
ToiTs § 311 (1965) as authority:
Negligent Misrepregentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability
1970]
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In applying the reasoning of Hempstead and Hanberry to certifica-
tion, there is no reason to distinguish between certifiers serving manu-
facturer clients and certifiers serving consumer clients.' Each makes the
for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance
upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by
the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
The ambiguity of this section is obvious. If the manufacturer is considered the
person to whom the information is given, the section might be interpreted as requiring
no reliance at all on the part of the user or consumer. Such an interpretation would
produce inconsistent results. No reliance would have to be shown if the representation
is made by a certifier serving manufacturer clients; at the same time, reliance would be
necessary if the certifier serves only consumer clients.
A sounder view would require reliance on the part of the user or consumer for
recovery for negligent misrepresentation. First, a requirement of reliance would eliminate
the inconsistency that might arise under a literal application of § 311. The liability of
certifiers for negligence would then be uniform. Moreover, the reliance requirement is
in harmony with the basic reason for imposing negligence liability on the certifier. As
the court stated in Hanberry, this liability is imposed because the certifier holds itself out
to the consuming public as an expert "for the purpose of encouraging and inducing" the
public to buy the product. 276 Cal. App. 2d at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521. Where no
reliance on the part of the consumer exists, this reasoning does not apply.
Finally-and most important-reliance serves as a liability-limiting factor. If recovery
were not predicated on reliance, the liability of the certifier, which tests and certifies many
lines of products, could be greater than that of the single manufacturer. See notes 44-49
and accompanying text infra. By imposing a reliance requirement-one not applicable to
manufacturer negligence-the liability of the certifier would be consonant with that
of the manufacturer whose product it certifies.
Thus, the court in Hanberry limited recovery to those "members of the consuming
public who rely on [the certifier's] endorsement . 276 Cal. App. 2d at -, 81 Cal.
Rptr. at 522.
17 Certifiers serving manufacturer clients include, among others, Good Housekeeping,
Parents' Magazine, Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., and United States Testing Co.
Consumers' Research, Inc. and Consumers Union are examples of certifiers serving con-
sumer clients. While the former test and certify under contract with the manufacturer,
the latter operate completely independently, directing certification primarily towards the
consumer.
In this regard, certain certifiers, such as Good Housekeeping and Parents' Magazine,
claim to represent the interests of consumers as well as manufacturers. Thus, Good House-
keeping asserts that although "[t]he fact that advertisers use the Seal in merchandising"
is basic to its certification program, "[t]he Guaranty's primary objective .. .has always
been that of a consumer's guide." The Good Housekeeping Consumers' Guaranty ...A
Guide to Its History and Authorized Use 2 (undated pamphlet published by Good House-
keeping). Moreover, to the extent that the public subscribes to their publications, such
certifiers are under contract with the consumer.
In reality, however, these certifiers primarily serve the interests of their manufacturer
clients. The National Commission on Product Safety has concluded that consumer pro-
tection is 'flawed by the laboratory's ecopomi ,dependence on the goodwill of the manu-
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same representation of product safety to the public and each expects
the same reliance on the part of the consumer.' 8 Considerations impor-
tant for the purpose of imposing strict liability, moreover, do not apply
to the more limited liability for negligent misrepresentation. 0 Both
types of certifiers, therefore, should share the same liability for negli-
gence. 20
On the other hand, differences between types of product defects
may be important under the theory of negligent misrepresentation.
Generally speaking, the certifier will be liable only for class defects, as
opposed to individual defects, in products.21 Since the certifier ordinarily
tests only a small sample of the product, its representation may be
viewed as limited to class defects; therefore, liability for an individual
defect would not follow. Moreover, even if the certifier's representation
facturer .... " COMM'N REPORT 2. As a result, the Commission has recommended regula-
tion by the Federal Trade Commission to avoid consumer deception. Id. at 116.
More important, however, such certifiers are distinguishable from those serving only
consumer clients by their control over production and distribution and by their greater
-ability to spread the cost of liability through the distributive chain. Notes 37-41 & 45-49
and accompanying text infra.
18 Given a requirement of reliance on the certification, liability should extend to all
users and consumers who do so rely, whether or not purchasers of the product. The
element of reliance, therefore, rather than the relationship between the parties in the
chain of distribution, would be the basic liability-limiting factor. See note 16 supra.
19 There is a reason to distinguish between types of certifiers for the purpose of
imposing strict liability based on the relative control exercised by each over production
and distribution. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text infra. The distinction is not
applicable to liability for negligent misrepresentation, which imposes a more limited duty
on the certifier, whether serving manufacturer or consumer clients. Because of this limited
duty-the exercise of reasonable care in the testing and certification of products-the
control of the certifier over production and distribution becomes less important.
Similarly, considerations of risk-spreading are inapplicable to liability for negligent
misrepresentation. Presumably, the strict liability of the certifier would be much greater
than its liability for negligence. As a result, a reason appears to distinguish between types
of certifiers based on their ability to pass the cost of liability to the public. See notes 45-49
and accompanying text infra. Where liability is more limited, however, this distinction
becomes less of a factor in imposing liability.
20 The privity requirement would be less a barrier to recovery against a certifier with
consumer clients. There a subscriber would ordinarily be in privity of contract with the
certifier. Moreover, because many certifiers serving manufacturer clients publish their
results for profit-e.g., Good Housekeeping and Parents' Magazine-privity might exist
between the certifier and the consumer. Where, however, the injured consumer merely
relies on a seal or similar certification carried by a product, there would be no privity of
contract.
21 Such a distinction is drawn in Note, Tort Liability of Independent Testing Agencies,
22 RuTrGERS L. Rlv. 299, 317 (1968). A class defect would be one common to an entire line
of products-for example, a defect of design-or one common to a large number of
individual items in a particular product line. An individual defect would be one unique-
to the particular item causing the injury. The defect alleged in Hanberry was a-class
defect. 276 Cal. App. 2d at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
1970] 137'
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were viewed as covering all product defects, injury from an individual
defect would probably not be the consequence of negligence on the
part of the certifier who tested only a sample.-
II
STRICT LIABILITY
A. Theories of Strict Liability
The imposition of strict liability on certifiers of products for per-
sonal injuries to the user or consumer presents a more complex problem.
Under modem products liability law, strict liability may be applied to
the certifier under three basic theories-breach of express warranty,
breach of implied warranty, and strict tort liability.23 Although differing
in several important respects, each theory represents a liability without
fault and without privity.
Courts have imposed strict liability on the manufacturer for breach
of express warranty for representations made to the ultimate consumer
in advertising,24 in sales literature,25 and on product labels.26 The man-
22 Even if negligence were involved in the certification of a product, such negligence
might not be the cause in fact of a consumer injury. Where the certifier negligently tests
only a sample, even due care cannot uncover a unique defect; the manufacturer would
not be on notice that the defect existed and therefore could not eliminate it. It may be
argued, however, that the certifier's negligence would be the cause of the consumer's
reliance and hence the cause of the injury.
23 For a general discussion of the theories of strict liability, see Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. RE-v. 791 (1966).
24 E.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (Sd Cir. 1961); Arfons
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958); Toole v. Richardson-Merrill,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145
Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956); Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d
210, 278 P.2d 728 (1955); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Connolly
v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963); Speigel v. Saks 34th St., 43
Misc. 2d 1065, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Markovich. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio
App. 265, 149 N.E2d 181 (1958).
25 E.g., Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Toole
v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Bahlman v.
Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); McCormick v. Hankscraft
Co., 278 Minn. 434, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App.
438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932),
aff'd, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
26 E.g,, Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955); Maecherlein
v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956); Lane v. CA. Swanson
& Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (dictum); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217
N.C. 542, 8 S.l.2d 813 (1940); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147
N.E.2d 612 (1958).
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ufacturer's liability has been extended to include property damage2 7
and economic loss. 28 Although likened to a contractual obligation,2
breach of express warranty has been considered principally a liability
in tort by both courts and commentators. 0 However, the consumer sus-
taining personal injuries must show reliance on the representation in
order to recover.3'
27 E.g., Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (label);
Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (advertising);
Brown v. Globe Labs., Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957) (literature).
28 E.g., Smith v. Gates Rubber Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 766, 47 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1965)
(literature); Presiding Bishop v, Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492, 32 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1963) (literature); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.Rd 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (advertising, literature, label); Inglis v. American
Motors Corp., 8 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (advertising); Ford Motor Co. v.
Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966) (advertising, literature).
29 The contractual warranty provisions of UNIFORM cOMmERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313 to
-318 do not apply to the certifier. The certifier is a seller of services-the testing and
certification of products-rather than a seller of "goods." As such, the certifier does not
fall within the coverage of Article 2. See, e.g., Epstein y. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp.
109, 197 A.2d 342 (Super. Ct. 1964); Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arrifiex Corp. of Am., 25 App.
Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1st Dep't 1966); Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 58
Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Although courts have made a similar distinction between sellers of goods and sellers
of services for the purposes of imposing common law strict liability, this distinction
appears to be disappearing. See Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65
(1969); cf. Gaxcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970). Courts are thus
free to extend the common law doctrine of strict liability to sellers of services whereas
they are not free to extend the statutory strict liability of the UCC. If policy considerations
dictate the imposition of strict liability on the certifier, this must be done through common
law decision.
30 The theory finally adopted by most of the decisions ... has been that of a non-
contractual "express warranty" made to the consumer in the form of the repre-
sentation to the public upon which he relies. . . . The liability . . . is liability
in tort, and not in contract; and if it is to be called one of "warranty," it is
at least a different kind of warranty from that involved in the ordinary sale of
goods from the immediate seller to the immediate buyer, and is subject to dif-
ferent rules.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402B, comment d at 360 (1905). A similar view of the
manufacturer's liability for breach of express warranty is taken by Williston, 1 S. WILLIs-
TON, THE LAw oF SALEs § 244a (rev. ed. 1948).
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965):
Misrepresentation by Seller of Chattels to Consumer
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning
the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical
harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the mis-
representation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
The comment makes it clear that reliance is required for recovery:
The rule here stated applies only where there is justifiable reliance upon the mis-
representation of the seller, and physical harm results because of such reliance,
1970]
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Closely related to liability for breach of express warranty are the
theories of breach of implied warranty and strict tort liability.3 2 A ma-
jority of American jurisdictions now impose strict liability on the manu-
facturer, without regard to negligence or privity, for personal injuries
to the user or consumer under one or the other theory.33 As with the
manufacturer's liability for breach of express warranty, both theories
represent obligations imposed by law rather than arising from contract.34
Unlike express warranty liability, no representation need be made by
the manufacturer, nor is reliance by the user or consumer required.3 5
and because of the fact which is misrepresented. It does not apply where the
misrepresentation is not known, or there is indifference to it, and it does not
influence the purchase or subsequent conduct.
Id., comment j at 362.
32 For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the theories of implied
warranty and strict tort liability, see Prosser, supra note 23, at 800-05.
33 Today, 27 jurisdictions apply the theory of strict liability in tort to the manu-
facturers of all products-Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Ten jurisdictions continue to
apply the theory of implied warranty-Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming. 1
CCH PROD. LIAB. REp. 4060 (1970).
34 This is dearly the case with the manufacturer's liability in strict tort. As for
breach of implied warranty, courts have often surrounded the theory with contractual
doctrine. See Prosser, supra note 23, at 800-05. However, the better view is that the
obligation is imposed by law and has nothing to do with any contract of sale. In Jacob
E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942), the Supreme Court
of Texas expressed this view with respect to strict liability in implied warranty for the
sale of unwholesome food:
[F]ictions are indulged merely because it is thought necessary to do so in order
to get away from the rule which requires privity of contract where recovery is
sought on an implied warranty growing out of a contract. We believe the better
and sounder rule places liability solidly on the ground of a warranty not in con-
tract, but imposed by the law as a matter of public policy.
Id. at 618, 164 S.W.2d at 832.
35 RsrATEmENT (SEcoND) Or TORTs § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The comment indicates that neither any representation nor any reliance is required
for recovery:
The rule stated in this Section does not require -any reliance on the part of
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B. Rationales of Strict Liability
The strict liability applied to the manufacturer of goods may be
extended to the certifier under any of the three theories. Given the
certifier's representation that the product is safe for ordinary use, liabil-
ity may be imposed for breach of express warranty to the consumer who
sustains personal injuries through reliance on the representation. At the
same time, in view of the certifier's participation in the process of pro-
duction and distribution, the law may impose an obligation in implied
warranty or strict tort similar to that of the manufacturer.
Although courts have increasingly imposed strict liability on manu-
facturers, application of strict liability to certifiers does not necessarily
follow. The reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer-
particularly his control over the process of production and distribution
and his ability to spread the risk of liability-may not apply to the certi-
fier, or they may apply to certain certifiers and not to others. Moreover,
differences between types of product defects assume particular impor-
tance.
1. Control of Production and Distribution
One reason advanced for the imposition of strict liability on the
manufacturer arises from the control exercised by the manufacturer
over the production and distribution of goods. Because the manufac-
turer is in a position to ensure protection from defects, whereas the
:onsumer is not, strict liability is appropriate.3 0
This reasoning does not apply to certifiers serving consumer clients.
Such certifiers exercise no direct control over the production and dis-
tribution of goods,; in this respect, their position differs little from that
of the consumers they serve.31 In the typical case the certifier selects,
the consumer upon the reputation, skill, or judgment of the seller who is to be
held liable, nor any representation or undertaking on the part of that seller.
The seller is strictly liable although, as is frequently the case, the consumer
does not even know who he is at the time of consumption.
Id., comment m at 355.
Similarly, liability for breach of implied warranty requires no reliance by the user
or consumer. See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185
(1966).
36 This argument is summarized by Prosser:
The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the maximum
possible protection that the law can give against dangerous defects in products
which consumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect them-
selves; and it justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of such products, of full
responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the supplier has not been
negligent.
Prosser, supra note 11, at 1122 (footnote omitted).
37 To be sure, the certifier possesses an advantage over his consumer clients in his
superior ltnqwledge of the particular product and his general expertise in testing.
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tests, and certifies a product without any contact with the manufac-
turer.38 Moreover, the representation made by the certifier is directed
primarily at the consumer; any impact on the manufacturer is indirect.3 9
A different case is presented by certifiers serving manufacturer
clients. Arguably, such certifiers do exercise an element of control over
production and distribution. Because it is under contract with the man-
ufacturer to test and certify the product, the certifier's representations
may affect the actions of the manufacturer in a direct way.40 At the same
time, however, this type of control over production and distribution is
more limited than that exercised by the manufacturer. Generally speak-
ing, the certifier handles only a small sample of the product, whereas the
manufacturer is responsible for all individual items reaching the user
or consumer. Therefore, the certifier should be, at most, responsible for
class defects in products rather than for individual defects.41
8 For example, Consumers' Research, Inc., publisher of Consumer Bulletin, selects
products to be tested ors the basis of consumer rather than manufacturer reqtest, and
manufacturers exercise no influence, direct or indirect, on the testing and certification
procedures. Furthermore, no use may be made of test results in the sale of certified
products. An Introduction to Consumers' Research 5-6 (undated pamphlet published by
Consumers' Research, Inc,).
Similarly, Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer Reports, describes its relationship
with manufacturers as follows:
CU accepts no advertising or product samples, and is not beholden in any way
to any commercial interest. Its Ratings and product reports are solely for the use
of readers of CONSUMER REPORTS. Neither the Ratings nor the reports may
be used in advertising or for any commercial purpose.
34 CONSUMER REPOATS, Dec. 1969, at 2.
S9 This indirect impact is brought about when the representation of the certifier
influences the consumer decision to buy or not buy a particular product. The actions of
the manufacturer will ultimately be affected through the mechanism of the marketplace.
To be sure, the certifier serving consumer clients may have a more immediate impact
on the manufacturer who reads the certifier's report or acts upon its representation.
In this case, however, the certifier, looking primarily to the consumer and not being
under contract with the manufacturer, remains only indirectly involved in production
and distribution.
40 For example, one purpose of the manufacturer in employing certification may be
to ensure the safety and quality of the product as well as to promote consumer demand.
In such a case the adverse finding of the certifier might cause the manufacturer to re-
design a product, or to withdraw it from the market.
41 The unfairness of imposing liability for individual defects on the certifier was
the basic reason for the court's rejection of strict liability in flanberry:
Application of either warranty or strict liability in tort would subject respondent
to liability even if the general design and material used in making this brand
of shoe were good, but the particular pair became defective through some mishap
in the manufacturing process. We believe this kind of liability for individually
defective items should be limited to th6se directly involved ifi the manufacturing
and supplying process, and should not be extended through warranty or strict
liability to a general endorser who makes no representation that it has examined
or tested each item marketed.
276 Cal. App. 2d at --, 81 Cal. kptr. at 524.
There is no reason why strict liability could not be limited to class defects in products
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2. "Risk-Spreading"
A second major reason for the imposition of strict liability on the
manufacturer for personal injuries to the user of consumer is that of
"risk-spreading." Under this theory, strict liability is imposed on the
manufacturer because he is in the best position to insure against the
loss and to pass the cost to the public by charging higher prices. 42
The application of the "risk-spreading" doctrine to the certifier
again depends on differences among certifiers and between types of
product defects. It can be argued that the certifier serving manufacturer
clients can pass on the cost of liability to the consuming public by charg-
ing higher prices for its services. Because certification is important to
the manufacturer, and because the manufacturer will be able to pass
the increased cost to others in the distributive chain, the manufacturer
will accept higher prices for certification services.4 3 Similarly, it can be
argued that the certifier serving consumer clients can distribute the cost
of liability by charging higher prices to its subscribers.
The fundamental problem with this analysis lies in the extent of
the certifier's potential liability, which would be many times greater
than that of the single manufacturer. While the manufacturer would be
liable for personal injuries caused by defects in its own line of products,
the certifier would be liable for such injuries caused by defects in many
lines of products. Assuming liability for individual product defects, the
certifier's potential liability would be equal to the aggregate liability of
all the manufacturers whose products are certified. 4 Even where limited
to class defects, the certifier's potential liability might be greater than
that of any single manufacturer.
as opposed to individual defects. Under an express warranty theory, for example, the
representation of the certifier might be interpreted as extending only to general defects
of design and material. Text accompanying notes 53-t4 infra. The absolute duty of the
certifier in implied warranty or strict tort might similarly be restricted to class defects.
42 The classic statement of this argument was made by Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its con-
sequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distibuted among the public
as a cost of doing business.
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring
opinion).
43 See Note, supra note 21, at 306-09.
44 For example, the seal of Underwriters' LabOratories, Inc. appears on over 800.000
products manufactured by some 15,000 companies. CoMM'N P*ORT 36. The extent of
possible strict liability for individual product defects would therefore be enormous. The
certifier in this ease could probably not obtain enough Insurance to cover his potential
liability; he would be forced to become a self-insurer, with all the hazards that that
entails.
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The ability of the certifier serving consumer clients to spread the
risk of strict liability is open to serious question.45 The certifier would
be forced to pass the cost of liability directly to the consumer rather
than through the manufacturer and other members of the distributive
chain.46 Among such certifiers there would probably be little risk-
spreading potential, either for individual or class defects.47
A somewhat different problem arises with respect to a certifier
serving manufacturer clients. Although, in theory, such a certifier may
pass the cost of liability to several parties in the distributive chain, it
might nevertheless be unable to obtain the insurance coverage re-
quired to meet potential liability for individual defects in many lines
of products. Even if such insurance were available, manufacturers and
others in the distributive chain might be unwilling to ultimately pay
the cost of insuring a burdensome liability for individual defects; the
cost of certification might outweigh its advantages.4 A different case
might be presented, however, by liability for class defects. The cost of
a more limited liability could probably be passed off to the certifier's
manufacturer clients, who could in turn spread the risk to the consumer
through the distributive chain.49 In this way, the certifier's ability to
spread the risk of strict liability would reflect the extent of its control
over the production and distribution of goods.
45 For example, both Consumers' Research, Inc. and Consumers Union are non-profit
organizations. There may be less ability to spread the risk here than in the case, say, of
Good Housekeeping, which garners great profits from its certification operations-profits
out of which the cost of liability may ultimately be taken. See note 49 infra.
46 The certifier serving manufacturer clients may pass the cost of liability to several
parties in the distributive chain-manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and consumer-
each of whom may assume part of the cost. In contrast, the certifier serving consumer
clients may only pass the cost to one party--the consumer-because he has no dealings,
direct or indirect, with any other party in the distributive chain.
47 In answer to this, it might be argued that strict liability serves a beneficial
purpose in eliminating from the marketplace the "inefficient" certifier-that is, the
certifier who cannot spread the risk effectively. See Note, supra note 21, at 307.
The reply is twofold. First, the certifier serving consumer clients performs a valuable
service to the public; it would be unnecessarily harsh to punish such a certifier by driving
him out of business for essentially faultless conduct. Such a policy might, in fact, deter
others from entering the field of consumer-oriented certification. Moreover, given this
reasoning, only "efficient" certifiers-those serving manufacturer clients-would survive,
a result contrary to the interests of the consuming public.
48 This would be the case with the manufacturer who produces a minimum of
defective products. Such a manufacturer would be forced, in effect, to pay for the, insur-
.ance of less skillful manufacturers, and certification might prove uneconomical. Ulti-
mately, only the less skillful manufacturers would employ certification.
49 Good Housekeeping claims to expend over one million dollars a year on the
certification of products. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1969, at 88. At the same time, however,
it garners over $36 million a year in advertising revenues. Bender, supra note 5, at col. 4.
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III
PROPOSED LIABILITY AND SOME LIMITATIONS
While courts have, in recent years, almost uniformly imposed
strict liability on the manufacturer," the extension of recovery to the
certifier presents more difficult problems. If some form of strict liabil-
ity-for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, or
strict tort liability-is to be imposed on the certifier, certain limitations
on that liability are suggested.
There is no sound reason for applying strict liability in any form
to the certifier serving consumer clients. Although making the eipress
representation that the product certified is safe for ordinary use, the
rationales of strict liability are inapplicable to such a certifier. At most,
this certifier exercises an indirect control over production and distri-
bution, and its ability to spread the risk directly to the consumer is
open to serious question. Moreover, some form of protection is provided
the user or consumer by an action for negligent misrepresentation.
In the case of the certifier serving manufacturer clients, the ration-
ales of strict liability pull both ways. On the one hand, such a certifier
is directly involved in and exercises direct control over production and
distribution; under contract with the manufacturer, his representations
influence the actions of the manufacturer as well as those of the con-
sumer. On the other, given a potentially burdensome liability for per-
sonal injuries, the certifier may be unable to spread the risk of liability,
at least for individual defects, as effectively as the manufacturer. These
considerations indicate that strict liability should be imposed, but that
the responsibility of the certifier should be more limited than that of
the manufacturer.
Such a limited liability would best be imposed for breach of ex-
press warranty. The representations of the certifier that the product
is safe for ordinary use are no different from those representations made
by manufacturers in advertising, in sales literature, or on labels, for
which strict liability has been imposed. At the same time, express war-
ranty liability offers certain limitations not present under the theories
of implied warranty or strict tort liability. For example, "justifiable
reliance" must be shown to sustain recovery for personal injuries,51
G0 Notes 24-28 & 33 supra.
51 RES'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
One student commentator has argued that, for the purposes of strict liability, con-
sumer reliance should be "assumed." Note, supra note 21, at 306. At the same time, this
writer points to reliance as a basic rationale of strict liability. Id. at 304-05. If reliance
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thus limiting the class of persons who may recover. Similarly, section
402B of the Restatement, in contrast to section 402A, limits recovery
to the "consumer."5 12 Presumably, therefore, the certifier serving manu-
facturer clients would be liable for breach of express warranty only to
the purchaser of the product and, perhaps, to persons in the household
or employ of the purchaser.5 3
A more important limitation would involve the extent of the cer-
tifier's express warranty to the consumer. Liability should generally
be confined to personal injuries caused by class defects in products. By
so interpreting the certifier's warranty, liability would bear some rela-
tion to the control exercised by the certifier over production and distri-
bution and would more accurately reflect the certifier's ability to spread
the risk,
Where certification clearly extends to individual defects, however,54
courts may allow certifiers to limit liability for breach of express war-
ranty,55 either by way of disclaimer56 or limitation of remedy. 57 Al-
though courts have been increasingly disposed to strike down such
by the consumer is a major reason for imposing strict liability on the certifier, however,
it should be shown tQ exist in fact.
52 RE TATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
5s In Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963), recovery
for breach of express warranty was allowed an auto mechanic, not a "consumer" of the
product, who allegedly relied upon the manufacturer's advertisements. Generally speaking,
however, recovery has been limited to purchasers of the product. Cases cited in notes
24-28 supra.
The comment to § 402B defines "consumer" as "one who makes use of the chattel
in the manner which a purchaser may be expected to use it," This definition includes the
employee or wife of the purchaser. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402B, comment
i at 362 (1965). In contrast, the term "user" in § 402A includes any person "passively
enjoying the benefit of the product" and a person making repairs upon it. Id. § 402A,
comment I at 354.
54 The certification, of Good Housekeeping and Parents' Magazine extends to all
"defects" in the product, whether individual or class. This is so even though only a small
sample of the product is tested. Courts may be unwilling to interpret such an express
warranty as extending only to class defects,
55 Any attempt to disclaim or limit liability for negligent misrepresentation would,
of course, be ineffective. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d - - 81 Cal.
Rptr. 519, 523 (1969).
56 Outright disclaimers would probably be unimportant in the field of product
certification. Such disclaimers would considerably impair, if not destroy. the credibility
of the certifier. Limitations on consumer remedies, though practically disclaimers, operate
more subtly on the consumer and are more likely to be uncritically accepted.
57 Both Good Housekeeping and Parents' Magazine limit their liability to refund or
replacement of the defective product. The Good Housekeeping Consumers' Guaranty...
A Guide to Its History and Authorized Use, supra note 17, at 2-3; Information on the
Parents' Magazine Guaranteed Seal, supra note 8, at 1. In this way, Good Housekeeping
limits its annual warranty losses to between $15,000 and $24,000. Bender, supra note 5,
at col. 3.
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limitations as contrary to public policy,58 the special problems of the
certifier serving manufacturer clients may make such provisions valid,
at least insofar as they relate to individual defects and the consumer is
apprised of their meaning. Attempts to disclaim or limit liability for
class defects should be invalid.
In addition to the remedy for negligent misrepresentation, there-
fore, by employing the theory of breach of express warranty, strict
liability may be imposed on the certifier serving manufacturer clients.
At the same time, the suggested liability would be more limited than
that of the manufacturer, reflecting the unique position of the certifier
in the economy and in the law.
Charles F. Rechlin
58 E.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 891 P.2d 168, 87 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1064); Henningsen V. Bloomfield Motors, Int., 82 N.J. 558, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
